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Abstract 
 
The analysis of corporate governance has been a one-sided affair.  The focus has been on 
“internal” accountability mechanisms, namely boards and shareholders.  Each has become 
more effective since debates about corporate governance began in earnest in the 1970s but it 
is doubtful whether this process can continue.  Correspondingly, it is an opportune time to 
expand the analysis of corporate governance.  This article does so by focusing on three 
“external” accountability mechanisms that can operate as significant constraints on 
managerial discretion, namely governmental regulation of corporate activity, competitive 
pressure from rival firms and organized labor.  A unifying feature is that each was an element 
of a theory of “countervailing power” economist John Kenneth Galbraith developed in the 
1950s with respect to corporations, an era when external accountability mechanisms did more 
than their internal counterparts to keep management in check.     
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance can be defined as the checks and balances affecting those who 
run companies.1  The topic has attracted much interest from academics and practitioners since 
use of the terminology became commonplace in the 1970s.2  The relevant literature is 
voluminous and arises from numerous disciplines, including law.3  The analysis of corporate 
governance has, however, been a strikingly one-sided affair.  The focus has been almost 
exclusively on “internal” checks and balances, namely scrutiny by the board of directors and 
by shareholders.4  The risk of a takeover – an external accountability mechanism known as 
the market for corporate control5 -- stands out as an exception.6  Some other external 
constraints on managerial discretion, such as auditors, rating organizations and the media, 
have also received attention in corporate governance circles.7  Other mechanisms, however, 
that currently operate as significant external checks on managerial discretion, or at least have 
operated in this manner in the relatively recent past, have been largely ignored.  This article 
functions as a corrective to the prevailing trend.   
                                                          
1  ROBERT E. WRIGHT, CORPORATION NATION 152 (2014). 
2  Ruth V. Aguilera et al., Connecting the Dots:  Bringing External Corporate 
Governance into the Corporate Governance Puzzle, 9 ACAD. MGMT. ANNALS 483, 484 
(2015); Brian R. Cheffins, The Corporate Governance Movement, Banks, and the Financial 
Crisis, 16 THEO. INQ. L. 1, 2 (2015).    
3  Aguilera et al., supra note 2 at 484; Brian R. Cheffins, Introduction, THE HISTORY OF 
MODERN U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ix, ix (Brian R. Cheffins, ed., 2011).   
4  Aguilera et al., supra note 2 at 484-85; JOHN C. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS:  THE 
PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1 (2006); Sean J. Griffith, Corporate 
Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 2075, 2079 (2016).   
5  Aguilera et al., supra note 2 at 496, 527-28; Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the 
Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965).   
6  James P. Walsh & James K. Seward, On the Efficiency of Internal and External 
Corporate Control Mechanisms, 15 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 421, 433-34 (1990). 
7  Aguilera et al., supra note 2 at 530-34, 537-39; COFFEE, supra note 4, 108-91, 283-
314.   
3 
 
Such an exercise is well-timed, in that the contribution of internal constraints to 
managerial accountability is unlikely to increase markedly any time soon.  Boards and 
shareholder activity have grown considerably in potency as corporate governance 
mechanisms over the past forty or so years.  Still, while boards and shareholders have 
developed over this time into meaningful (if imperfect) constraints on managerial discretion, 
the momentum has probably stalled.  With boards, for instance, there is little room left for 
restructuring that will bolster their monitoring capabilities.  Most directors are formally 
independent of management and with topics where objectivity is crucial, such as the auditing 
function, executive compensation and the selection of nominees for board election, boards of 
publicly listed companies pretty much universally delegate heavily to committees staffed by 
independent directors.  Moreover, over the past decade and a half many public companies 
have changed their director selection procedures in a manner that enhances shareholder 
influence.    
As for stockholders, activist hedge funds have since the early 2000s been putting 
meaningful pressure on public company executives.  Much has also been made of the 
influence investment funds designed to track major stock market indices are poised to wield 
due to dramatic growth in the percentage of shares they own in public companies.  Major 
caveats are in order, however.  Hedge fund interventions have been tailing off and investors 
have begun to withdraw their cash due to mediocre returns.  With index tracking funds, a 
business model that favors a “hands off” approach to corporate governance suggests they are 
unlikely to displace a traditional reticence on the part of major institutional investors to 
intervene in the running of public companies.   
This article does not purport to offer a comprehensive analysis of external constraints 
on managerial autonomy.  The case that external accountability mechanisms merit closer 
scrutiny will instead be made by focusing on three historically important examples, namely 
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state regulation of corporate activity, competitive pressure from rival firms and organized 
labor.  A unifying feature is that John Kenneth Galbraith took account of each of them when 
considering “countervailing power” in the corporate context in his 1952 book American 
Capitalism:  The Concept of Countervailing Power.8  Galbraith, who has been hailed as “the 
most famous, most influential, and best-connected American economist of all time,”9 was 
focusing on constraints relevant to corporations generally rather than corporate executives 
specifically.  Nevertheless, the sources of countervailing power this article focuses on were – 
and are -- salient for management as well as firms.   
Since the 1950s, regulation, competitive pressure from rival firms and organized labor 
have each operated at various times as a significant check on managerial discretion.  Indeed, 
their impact on public company executives has sometimes been more pronounced than that of 
boards and shareholders.  Our knowledge of the corporate governance efficacy of the 
countervailing power mechanisms considered here is limited as compared with boards and 
shareholders because of the one-sided nature of corporate governance analysis.  Nevertheless, 
changes affecting the public company from the mid-20th century through to the present day 
indicate clearly that regulation, competitive pressure and unions have each substantially 
curbed managerial discretion at various junctures and thus merit further investigation as 
governance mechanisms.   
Events occurring in the 1950s and 1960s underscore the importance of sources of 
countervailing power as a check on managers of large American corporations.  For executives 
running public companies immediately following World War II, “internal” constraints on 
their discretion -- scrutiny by the board of directors and the shareholders -- were more 
                                                          
8  JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM:  THE CONCEPT OF 
COUNTERVAILING POWER (1952, rev. ed., 1956).   
9  James K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State, GUARDIAN, May 5, 2007.    
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theoretical than actual.  Boards deferred to management, at least absent a crisis.  Most shares 
were owned directly by individual investors with tiny shareholdings and little appetite for 
scrutinizing companies.  There correspondingly was a real risk that senior executives would 
take advantage of what Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means famously described in 1932 as a 
separation of ownership and control to exercise managerial authority in a manner that was 
contrary to the interests of stockholders and others closely affiliated with companies.10  
Indeed, the wide discretion afforded to corporate executives meant the 1950s and 1960s were 
a heyday of “managerial capitalism”.11 
Despite the weakness of internal corporate governance mechanisms, mid-20th century 
managerial wrongdoing was rare.  Executives refrained for the most part from taking a 
freewheeling or underhanded approach with the discretion available to them.  One reason was 
that, with organized labor being a powerful force in numerous key industries, unions 
functioned as a significant constraint for management.  It was also important that the mid-20th 
century heyday of managerial capitalism was simultaneously an era of “regulated 
capitalism.”12  Governmental action, or the threat thereof, impinged upon executive discretion 
in various significant ways.  For instance, in industrial sectors such as telecommunications, 
transport and utilities regulators exercised control over entry, prices and service provision 
standards.   
                                                          
10  ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION & PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 6, 250 (1932). 
11  GEORGE P. BAKER & GEORGE DAVID SMITH, THE NEW FINANCIAL CAPITALISTS:  
KOHLBERG KRAVIS ROBERTS AND THE CREATION OF CORPORATE VALUE 10 (1998); Ronald 
Dore, William Lazonick & Mary O’Sullivan, Varieties of Capitalism in the Twentieth 
Century, 15(4) OXF. REV. ECON. POL. 102, 109 (1999); ALEXANDER STYHRE, THE MAKING 
OF SHAREHOLDER WELFARE SOCIETY:  A STUDY IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 57 (2018). 
12  DAVID M. KOTZ, THE RISE AND FALL OF NEOLIBERAL CAPITALISM 6, 50-53 (2015).    
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The balance between various internal and external governance mechanisms then 
changed over time.  Under the mantle of “corporate governance” internal constraints were 
strengthened.  Boards of directors, for instance, were reconfigured to bolster the role of 
“outside” directors as monitors of management.  Regulatory reforms undertaken in the wake 
of a series of major corporate scandals in the early 2000s and the financial crisis of 2008 
reinforced the process.  With shareholders, the prospects for intervention improved as the 
ownership stakes of well-resourced “mainstream” institutional investors such as pension 
funds and mutual funds grew at the expense of individual stockholders.  Pension funds and 
mutual funds failed to take command of the governance scene in the manner that seemed 
possible.  Activist hedge funds that stepped forward in the 2000s lobbied aggressively and 
effectively, however, for change in the various public companies they targeted.  
Regulation and organized labor, in contrast with boards and shareholders, receded as 
constraints on public company executives during the closing decades of the 20th century.  
Unions had begun a process of pronounced, secular decline and a deregulation trend was 
prompting the dismantling of controls in a wide range of industries.  On the other hand, 
competitive pressure from rival firms was growing in importance as an external constraint.  
As the 20th century drew to a close, challenges from foreign and domestic rivals were eroding 
considerably market power that had served to insulate heretofore dominant corporations and 
their executives.   
While the potency of internal constraints on managerial discretion has increased 
markedly since the managerial capitalism era, again it is doubtful whether that trend will 
continue.  The fact that internal accountability mechanisms may have peaked as constraints 
on managerial discretion means it is time to reverse past analytical neglect of external 
constraints on managerial discretion.  If little additional can be expected from boards and 
shareholders, then future upgrading of managerial accountability will depend largely on 
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external mechanisms.  In the 1980s, the market for corporate control carried much of the 
freight, with those running public companies being highly apprehensive about an unwelcome 
takeover bid.13  Hostile takeover bids, however, are now a rarity and arguably are “on life 
support”.14  External managerial constraints Galbraith identified when describing 
countervailing power – regulation, competition from rivals and unions -- thus become logical 
candidates to investigate.   
While from a corporate governance perspective Galbraith’s sources of countervailing 
power merit greater scrutiny than they have received, none offers a magical solution to 
challenges associated with fostering managerial accountability.  Since the secular decline 
affecting unions has continued to the present day, organized labor will only rarely operate as 
a meaningful check on managerial discretion.  As for pressure from rivals, growing fears of 
an anti-competitive accumulation of market power by currently dominant corporations 
suggest competition may be on the wane as an external accountability mechanism.  With 
regulation, deregulatory initiatives the Trump administration has undertaken indicate 
government action may recede in importance as a managerial constraint, at least over the 
short- to medium-term.   
While none of the sources of countervailing power considered here is a managerial 
accountability silver bullet each potentially has a significant role to play in constraining 
executive discretion.  They correspondingly merit consideration – thus far largely lacking -- 
as part of any holistic analysis of the checks and balances affecting those who run companies.  
                                                          
13  Brian R. Cheffins, Corporate Governance since the Managerial Capitalism Era, 89 
BUS. HIST. REV. 717, 729-30 (2015).   
14  Steven M. Davidoff, With Fewer Barbarians at the Gate, A New Threat Emerges, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2013, B4.  See also Matthew D. Cain, Stephen B. McKeon & Steven 
Davidoff Solomon, Do Takeover Laws Matter? Evidence From Five Decades of Hostile 
Takeovers, 124 J. FIN. ECON. 464, 468 (2017) (empirical data).   
8 
 
This article seeks to redress the situation, at least partially.  It does so primarily from a 
historical perspective, analyzing the contribution that unions, competition from rivals and 
regulation made from the 1950s onwards in enhancing managerial accountability in public 
companies.   
This article will not be offering definitive verdicts on the veracity of external 
accountability mechanisms.  Plenty of scope remains for further analysis from empirical, 
legal and theoretical perspectives.  Given, however, that it is unlikely that internal 
accountability mechanisms will become markedly more robust in the foreseeable future such 
analysis should begin sooner rather than later.    
The article proceeds as follows.  Part II focuses on the 1950s and 1960s heyday of 
managerial capitalism.  It explains by reference to Galbraith’s notion of countervailing power 
why wayward executives were a rarity in an era when internal accountability mechanisms 
were weak.  Part III considers how external accountability mechanisms of which Galbraith 
took account were reconfigured from the mid-20th century through to the early 2010s.  Part 
IV describes how both boards and shareholders became more potent checks on public 
company executive discretion over the same time period, albeit often in a fitful fashion.  Part 
V tackles the present-day situation.  Reasons why internal accountability mechanisms may 
have peaked are canvassed.  The current status of unions, pressure from rivals and regulation 
as external checks on managerial autonomy will also be assessed.  Part VI concludes.     
II. MID-20TH CENTURY MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
By the 1950s it had become the norm for large American public corporations to lack a 
dominant shareholder, resulting in full-time executives potentially having virtually 
untrammelled managerial control.  These executives, as owners of only a tiny percentage of 
shares, had meaningful incentives to pursue their own personal agenda rather than to seek to 
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boost profits and enhance shareholder returns.  Nevertheless, executive misconduct was a 
rarity during the managerial capitalism heyday of the 1950s and 1960s.  This was primarily 
due to external rather than internal constraints on managerial discretion.      
A. Ownership Separates From Control 
As the 1950s got underway the editors of Fortune hailed “the transformation of 
American capitalism,” indicating in so doing that a key feature was that “the big modern 
enterprise is…run by hired management.”15  From a legal standpoint, this was not an obvious 
outcome.  Under what has been referred to as “the received legal model of the corporation”, 
“the board of directors manages the corporation’s business and makes policy; the officers act 
as agents of the board and execute its decisions; and the shareholders elect the board….”16  
What occurred instead was that authority to run corporations was vested in the hands of the 
officers (i.e. full-time executives) rather than the directors, who had delegated their 
managerial power.17  Shareholder election of directors simultaneously verged toward an 
empty formality.  This was because incumbent executives could dominate through control of 
the corporations they ran the solicitation of proxies, the written documentation most 
shareholders would use to cast their votes.18   
Share ownership patterns reinforced managerial dominance.  By the mid-20th century 
the typical large public corporation lacked a shareholder, or tight coalition of shareholders, 
who owned a large enough stake to dictate the outcome of most, if not all, shareholder votes.  
There correspondingly was a separation of ownership and control.  This is a pattern that has 
                                                          
15  EDITORS (FORTUNE), USA:  THE PERMANENT REVOLUTION 65, 67, 78 (1951). 
16  MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION:  A LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 1 (1976). 
17  Id. at 139-41. 
18  Id. at 97-104. 
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been closely associated with Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means and their 1932 classic The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property.19  Indeed, the term “Berle-Means corporation” 
(or “Berle and Means corporation”) has been adopted as shorthand for large firms with 
widely dispersed share ownership.20  Data Berle and Means compiled, however, did not 
match up fully with their rhetoric.  They found that as of 1930 management control, defined 
as a lack of evidence of a shareholder with an ownership stake of 20 percent or more, only 
prevailed in a minority (88) of the 200 largest non-financial companies ranked by assets.21   
While a separation of ownership and control was not the norm as of the early 1930s, 
matters were evolving in that direction.  The New York Times said in 1955 of public 
companies and their executives: 
“A generation or so ago, most corporations were held by small groups of investors.  
Often as not, members of the founding family held the majority of shares.  Then came 
in succession the Great Depression, high taxes on incomes and estates and the need 
for new capital in a rapidly growing economy.  Result:  today, the stock of many 
companies is widely distributed among thousands or even hundreds of thousands of 
shareholders. 
                                                          
19  BERLE AND MEANS supra note 10.   
20  See, for example, Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Governance, 18 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLICY 671, 674 (1995); Rafael La Porta, Florencio López-de-Silanes, 
Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 
474 (1999); Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law between the United States 
and Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 697, 698 (2005).  The 
term was coined by Mark Roe -- Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate 
Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 11 (1991).   
21  BERLE & MEANS supra note 10 at 98-101, 106.  Berle and Means actually classified 
88½ companies as being under management control.  The half was awarded due to a “special 
situation”, namely the utility Chicago Rys. Co. being in receivership (at 101).   
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 Management, in effect, has become a high-priced employe(e).”22 
The Times’ characterization of changes affecting ownership patterns in large corporations 
reflected the general consensus.  Harvard economist Edward Mason observed in 1959 
“(a)lmost everyone now agrees that in the large corporation, the owner is, in general a passive 
recipient; that typically control is in the hands of management; and that management 
normally selects its own replacements.”23  At that point there was an absence of reliable data 
confirming the general consensus regarding ownership patterns.24  Empirical studies carried 
out in the 1960s and 1970s, however, largely corroborated assumptions that a separation of 
ownership and control was the norm in large business enterprises.25 
B. The Possibility of Abuse 
In a corporation lacking dominant shareholders management will necessarily own 
only a small percentage of the outstanding shares.26  The executives in turn will, as 
shareholders, receive only a small proportion of the returns derived from the profit-enhancing 
activities they engage in on behalf of the company.  They correspondingly will have an 
incentive to further their own interests at the expense of other investors.27    
With it becoming the norm in the mid-20th century for large U.S. corporations to lack 
dominant stockholders, and with the scope that exists for abuse of managerial discretion 
                                                          
22  Richard Rutter, Proxy Wards Shed No Gore, Much Ink, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1955, 
44. 
23  Edward S. Mason, Introduction in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 1, 4 
(Edward S. Mason ed., 1959).    
24  Brian Cheffins & Steve Bank, Is Berle and Means Really a Myth?, 83 BUS. HIST. 
REV. 443, 456 (2009). 
25  Id. at 468-69 (2009) (see Appendix 2). 
26  George J. Stigler and Claire Friedland, The Literature of Economics: The Case of 
Berle and Means, 26 J.L. & ECON. 237, 238 (1983). 
27  Cheffins, supra note 3, xi.  
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when share ownership is diffuse, the separation of ownership and control constituted what 
would be referred to subsequently as “the core fissure” in American corporate governance.28  
As early as 1932 Berle and Means were asking readers “have we any justification for 
assuming that those in control of a modern corporation will also choose to operate it in the 
interests of their owners?”29  Mason indicated similarly in 1959 “the independence of 
corporate management from any well-defined responsibility to anyone…carries with it the 
possibilities of abuse.”30  
C. Prosperity and Propriety  
While it was well-known during the 1950s and 1960s that the separation of ownership 
and control in large corporations posed risks, few of whatever fears existed were borne out.  
“Prosperity was the dominant theme of the postwar era”31 as the U.S. economy grew smartly 
at a rate of 3.7 percent annually between 1948 and 1973.32  Large public companies 
flourished in this milieu.  The S&P 500 stock market index increased more than 650 percent 
between January 1950 and December 1968.33 
There were during the 1950s and the 1960s some newsworthy examples of unethical 
managerial behaviour.34  Nevertheless, amidst considerable corporate success, the dominant 
                                                          
28  Mark J. Roe, The Inevitable Instability of American Corporate Governance, 1 CORP. 
GOV. L. REV. 1, 2 (2005).   
29  BERLE & MEANS, supra note 10, 113.   
30  Mason, supra note 23, 11.   
31  WYATT WELLS, AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1945-2000:  CONTINUITY AND CHANGE FROM 
MASS PRODUCTION TO THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 27 (2003). 
32  NITIN NOHRIA, DAVIS DYER & FREDERICK DALZELL, CHANGING FORTUNES:  
REMAKING THE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION 38 (2002). 
33  During the 1950s and 1960s, the S&P 500 peaked at 109.37 in December 1968.  It 
opened at 16.66 in January 1950.  See S&P 500/Historical Data, available at 
https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/%5EGSPC/history/ (accessed May 14, 2018).    
34  Cheffins, supra note 13, 721.   
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image of public company leadership during the heyday of managerial capitalism was that of 
executives exercising corporate power in a self-restrained and socially responsible manner.35  
For instance, while Adolf Berle expressed concerns in 1932 that those controlling public 
companies would abuse the discretion available to them, in 1959 he observed “(c)onsiderable 
progress has been made in eliminating the spasms of dishonesty or near dishonesty which too 
often disgraced our system in the past decades.”36  A lengthy 1966 New York Times essay on 
big business noted that “(t)he big story is not really one of callous exploitation or crass 
irresponsibility” and suggested that “articulate segments of the American public seem at 
times to show more faith in United States Steel than the United States Senate.”37  The 
retrospective verdict has similarly been that the mid-20th century was characterized by 
managerial propriety.38  For instance, law professors William Black and June Carbone have 
said of the 1950s and 1960s that the “era produced a high degree of corporate honesty 
and….(l)arge-scale corporate scandals….largely disappeared.”39  
D. Weak Internal Constraints 
Given the dearth of executive wrongdoing when managerial capitalism was in the 
ascendancy and given that present-day analysis of corporate governance revolves primarily 
around internal constraints on managerial discretion, namely boards and shareholders, a 
                                                          
35  GABRIEL KOLKO, WEALTH AND POWER IN AMERICA:  AN ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL CLASS 
AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION 55 (1962) (the author of this study dissented from the consensus).   
36  ADOLF A. BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY:  A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 3 (1959).   
37  Andrew Hacker, A Country Called Corporate America, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1966, 
Sunday Magazine, 9. 
38  See, for example, DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM:  THE FUNDAMENTAL 
FLAWS IN CORPORATE AMERICA AND WHERE THEY CAME FROM 106 (2005); Mark Mizruchi 
& Howard Kimeldorf, The Historic Context of Shareholder Value Capitalism 17 POL. POWER 
& SOC. THEORY 213, 216 (2005).   
39  William K. Black & June Carbone, Economic Ideology and the Rise of the Firm as a 
Criminal Enterprise, 49 AKRON L. REV. 371, 388 (2016).    
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logical inference to draw would be that during the 1950s and 1960s directors and/or 
stockholders were making substantial efforts to keep public company executives in check.  
This was not the case.  Neither boards nor shareholders were likely to intervene to forestall or 
correct managerial missteps, absent a crisis.   
1. Boards  
Boards do not run public companies despite being legally empowered to do so under 
state corporate law.  Executives the directors appoint do so, exercising delegated managerial 
authority.40  From a governance perspective, the obvious role for boards to play is to keep the 
executives in charge in check, with directors detached and independent from management 
being the logical candidates to foster accountability due to their objectivity.41  This 
“monitoring” model of the board gained wide currency during the 1970s.42  The idea that the 
board could and should act as a managerial “watchdog” was by no means unfamiliar, 
however, during the 1950s and 1960s.43  In 1956 the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
required companies listed on the Exchange to have at least two independent directors on the 
board.44  By the late 1950s a consensus was developing amongst experts on boards that 
ideally a majority of directors of a public company should be individuals not holding 
                                                          
40  Supra note 17 and related discussion.   
41  BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW:  THEORY, STRUCTURE AND OPERATION 605 
(1997). 
42  Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Trouble With Boards, PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 17, 31-32 (F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, eds., 2010).  See also infra notes 
239-40 and accompanying text.     
43  See, for example, MELVIN T. COPELAND & ANDREW R. TOWL, THE BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 146 (1947) (“One of the most common theories 
about directors…is that a main task of directors is to serve as watchdogs, policing the 
executives….”). 
44  Brian R. Cheffins, Steven A. Bank and Harwell Wells, Shareholder Protection Across 
Time, 68 U. FLA. L. REV. 691, 744 (2017).  
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executive posts.45  The pattern was simultaneously becoming increasingly prevalent in 
practice.  Before the 1950s drew to a close executive directors were outnumbered on the 
board in a majority of leading manufacturing companies and in most of the largest firms 
outside the industrial sector.46   
Despite growing outside director representation, the consensus during the 1950s and 
1960s was that only a crisis would preclude boards from deferring to the management team.47  
What Berle referred to in 1959 as “obsolete processes of selection” of directors48 lent 
credence to skepticism about boards.  Under state corporate law, the shareholders had the 
right to elect the directors.49  Practically speaking, however, the choice shareholders had was 
limited on the vast majority of occasions to voting on a single slate of nominees the 
incumbent board selected.50  These nominees were in turn almost inevitably endorsed by 
huge majorities as shareholders refraining from attending stockholder meetings in person sent 
in proxy documentation authorizing the voting of their shares by those already running the 
                                                          
45  MABEL NEWCOMER, THE BIG BUSINESS EXECUTIVE:  THE FACTORS THAT MADE HIM 
29-30 (1955) (describing the views of the “majority of those writing on the subject”); THE 
DIRECTOR LOOKS AT HIS JOB 82 (Courtney C. Brown & E. Everitt Smith, eds., 1957).   
46  Managers Fade as Directors, BUS. WK., June 27, 1959, 72 (citing a survey of 925 
companies); John Chamberlain, Why it’s Harder and Harder to Get a Good Board, FORTUNE, 
Nov. 1962, 108 (citing a study by Fortune); MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS:  MYTH AND 
REALITY 111-12 (1971) (providing data for manufacturing companies for 1953, 1958, 1961 
and 1966).    
47  DIRECTOR LOOKS, supra note 45, 46; HERRYMON MAURER, GREAT ENTERPRISE:  
GROWTH AND BEHAVIOR OF THE BIG CORPORATION 201 (1955); J.M. JURAN & J. KEITH 
LOUDEN, THE CORPORATE DIRECTOR 293 (1966). 
48  BERLE, supra note 36, 108.    
49  HAROLD KOONTZ, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT 76 
(1967).   
50  STANLEY C. VANCE, THE CORPORATE DIRECTOR:  A CRITICAL EVALUATION 4 (1968). 
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company.51  With this arrangement, caustically described as a “communist ballot”52 and “a 
total farce”,53 being nominated by the board was the key to becoming and remaining a 
director.54   
By the 1980s it would become commonplace for boards of public companies to 
delegate the task of selecting board candidates to a nomination committee comprised of 
independent directors.55  Such committees were a rarity, however, in the 1950s and 1960s.56  
It instead usually fell to the chief executive to take the lead with the selection of board 
candidates.57  This occurred despite awareness that it was less than ideal for chief executives 
to recruit only directors they would be happy to work with.58 
2. Shareholders 
Richard Eells, in a 1962 analysis of corporate “government” (he was a very early 
adopter of the term “corporate governance”), specifically identified shareholders as an 
internal mechanism that could stifle the counterproductive exercise of managerial power.59  
He said, however, that “attempts…to activate shareholder control of management have had 
                                                          
51  Mortimer M. Caplin, Proxies, Annual Meetings and Corporate Democracy:  The 
Lawyer’s Role, 37 VA. L. REV. 653, 654-55 (1951).     
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insignificant results” and that “(t)he controls of the corporate electorate – the stockholders – 
over board and management are severely limited in the large public-issue corporation.”60  
Others concurred.  Shareholders in the managerial capitalism era were described as 
“passive”,61 and “an apathetic bunch”62 that played “no active role at all.”63   
It was hardly surprising the prospects for meaningful shareholder governance 
involvement were bleak during the 1950s and 1960s.  “Household” investors – primarily 
individuals buying and selling securities for their own personal account -- collectively owned 
most of the shares in publicly traded companies (Figure 1).64  Shareholders of this sort 
typically lack the aptitude, resources and firm-specific information needed to intervene 
productively in corporate affairs.65  Private (“retail”) investors have little incentive to step 
forward in any case, given the hassle involved and given that the typical individual 
stockholder owns a tiny stake and thus will only benefit trivially in relation to any share price 
increase associated with a successful intervention.66   They indeed were caustically labelled in 
1967 “20 Million Careless Capitalists.”67 
Figure 1:  U.S. Corporate Stock Held by Households and Institutions, 1950-1970 
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Source:  O’Sullivan (2000)68 
While private stockholders dominated share ownership throughout the 1950s and 
1960s, their institutional counterparts were growing in importance (Figure 1).  Suggestions 
followed that mainstream institutional investors such as mutual funds and pension funds 
might function as a source of managerial discipline in a way that private shareholders could 
not.  For instance, in 1959 John Kenneth Galbraith identified the accumulation of shares by 
institutional shareholders as “the one looming threat to the autonomy of the professional 
managers.”69  However, institutional investors, setting a pattern that would prevail over the 
next few decades, failed to step forward to the extent that seemed possible.  A 1965 study of 
institutional shareholders characterized them as “silent partners” and indicated “(f)or the most 
part, institutions are investors not controllers.”70   
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E. Galbraith and Countervailing Power 
While the primary theme in Berle and Means’ The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property was the separation of ownership and control in large business enterprises it 
addressed others.71  One was documenting a growing concentration of economic power in 
major corporations.72  Indeed, the most widely-quoted statistic in the book was that the 
largest 200 non-financial American corporations accounted for half of all corporate wealth 
and 43 percent of all corporate income.73   
Consistent with an American tradition of suspicion of private business power, 
following World War II the dominance of large enterprises prompted concern among many.74  
The uneasiness was somewhat paradoxical, however, given the robust performance of the 
American economy.75  How was it that an economy could be so successful if large business 
enterprises that were a potent source of apprehension were simultaneously dominating that 
economy?  John Kenneth Galbraith sought to resolve the paradox in his 1952 book American 
Capitalism, a revised edition of which was published in 1956.76    
Galbraith acknowledged that under mainstream economic theory where business was 
operating in a market setting involving many buyers and many sellers the operation of 
competitive forces “solved the operating problems of the economy.”77  Citing, however, “the 
epochal investigation” of Berle and Means and subsequent studies that had prompted “wide 
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acceptance” of “the notion that there was extensive concentration in American industry,”78 
Galbraith maintained “a basic supposition of capitalism – the supposition that it was socially 
efficient” was thrown into question.79  Galbraith also noted that with large corporations 
having achieved considerable prominence fears of corporate overreach would inevitably 
arise, saying “that it was easy to suppose that since competition had disappeared, all effective 
restraint on private power had disappeared.”80  
Yet the American economy was performing well.  Moreover, Galbraith acknowledged 
that while the data on corporate concentration implied “the American is controlled, livelihood 
and soul, by the large corporation; in practice he seems not to be completely enslaved.”81  
Galbraith’s explanation why there was economic prosperity and continued personal 
autonomy despite the prevalence of large, seemingly omnipotent corporations was that “new 
restraints on private power” existed in the form of “countervailing power.”82  He maintained 
that “as a common rule, we can rely on countervailing power to appear as a curb on economic 
power.”83  The consequent balancing served in turn as a means of stabilization and 
legitimation in the post-World War II economic order.84 
Galbraith, in developing his theory of countervailing power, focused to a significant 
extent on buyers and sellers of a product or service.  He maintained powerful sellers would 
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prompt the growth of powerful buyers and vice versa, such as large automobile companies 
counteracting dominant steel mills.85  Galbraith’s sources of countervailing power were not 
restricted, however, to a matching up of powerful sellers and buyers.  Indeed, he suggested 
“(t)he operation of countervailing power is to be seen with the greatest clarity in the labor 
market.”86  Galbraith had organized labor in mind here, suggesting that “one finds the 
strongest unions in the United States where markets are served by the strongest 
corporations.”87  He argued the pattern existed partly because “the strength of the 
corporations” involved made “it necessary for workers to develop the protection of 
countervailing power.”88  Also significant was that the firms in question frequently had 
oligopolistic control of their industries and were prospering accordingly.  Through a union a 
powerful company’s employees could more effectively “share in the fruits of the 
corporation’s market power.”89 
Though Galbraith took pains to emphasize how the prevalence of large corporations 
had compromised the operation of competitive forces in the economy, pressure from rivals 
within an industry remained an element of his analysis of countervailing power in the 
corporate realm.  He said there was a “convention against price competition” due to “the 
typical modern market of few sellers.”90  Competition nevertheless remained a “regulator of 
economic activity.”91  As Galbraith noted, when there were numerous buyers and sellers in a 
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particular market “(t)he active restraint is provided by the competitor who offers, or threatens 
to offer, a better bargain.”92  He indicated that “(t)here are still important markets where the 
power of the firm as (say) a seller is checked or circumscribed by those who provide a similar 
or a substitute product or service.”93 
Galbraith also treated the state as an important facet of his world of countervailing 
power.  He argued that where countervailing powers were emerging in response to corporate 
dominance, government should foster their development because doing so “strengthens the 
capacity of the economy for autonomous self-regulation and thereby lessens the amount of 
over-all government control or planning that is required or sought.”94  Galbraith maintained 
that this in fact was being done to a substantial degree, suggesting “the support of 
countervailing power has become in modern times the major peacetime function of the 
federal government.”95  He cited as an example federal legislation enacted during the mid-
1930s that put unions on a sound organizational footing and thereby helped to foster a 
dramatic increase in union membership.96  Galbraith also drew attention to antitrust law, 
suggesting that steps taken to preclude mergers that would result in monopoly power and to 
dismantle existing monopolies should be beneficial because it was “much easier for 
countervailing power to break into a position of market strength maintained by an imperfect 
coalition of three, four, or a dozen firms than in a position held by one firm.”97 
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Galbraith, in citing unions, pressure from rivals and state intervention in the context 
of countervailing power, was identifying constraints relevant for corporations.  He was not 
focusing, as such, on limitations on managerial discretion.  Still, links existed.  Antitrust law, 
for instance, could have direct personal implications for executives.  Galbraith said that “(a)s 
the antitrust laws are now financed and enforced, the head of any large American corporation 
must count on the possibility of being hailed into court at least once in his lifetime.”98   
More generally, Galbraith implicitly equated countervailing power constraints on 
corporations as constraints on their executives.  For Galbraith managerial accountability (or 
lack thereof) was not an analytical priority because he did not think that purely self-serving 
goals motivated corporate executives substantially.  Corporate success, defined by firm size, 
instead largely correlated with managerial success.  Galbraith argued “(t)he income of a 
businessman is no longer a measure of his achievement; it has become a datum of secondary 
interest.”99  The key metric instead was power, which was the benchmark for prestige in the 
business world.100  “The size of the corporation”, in turn was the “rough index of the power 
the individual exercises,” with “ducal honors” in “the business peerage” going to those who 
ran the largest firms.101  Given the alliance of interest between large public companies and 
their executives, it followed that countervailing power that limited the growth and authority 
of corporations would simultaneously be a check on the executives in charge of those firms.  
Galbraith thus implicitly treated unions, regulation and competition as external managerial 
accountability mechanisms as part of his countervailing power characterization of American 
capitalism.   
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F. Countervailing Power During the 1950s and 1960s 
In 1959 Adolf Berle, having acknowledged that American corporations had recently 
been relatively free from managerial excess, said this had not occurred due to the arrival of 
“saints” but rather due to external checks public opinion shaped.102  Economist Robert Eagly 
struck a similar chord in an essay published the same year in which he said “a new 
motivational ethos” did not explain why, in contrast with the situation in 1900, “American 
big business operates with a keen awareness of its human environment.” 103  Eagly cited 
instead “the changing institutional environment within which big business operates.”104   
Norton Long, a political scientist also writing in 1959, recognized in tandem with 
Eagly that taking into account the environment within which public companies operated was 
required to explain how corporate executives were conducting themselves.  Long accepted 
that the typical public company executive “has a concern for harmony and the avoidance of 
trouble that sets him apart from his predecessors” and noted “present managerial behaviors 
give rise to doubt as to unrestrained corporate power” 105  The explanation for this state of 
affairs, according to Long, was that “management is surrounded by a network of constraints 
and fears” but he acknowledged the network’s operation was “as yet an unwritten chapter in 
industrial sociology.”106  With the benefit of hindsight, two sources of countervailing power 
Galbraith identified, unions and state intervention (including the threat thereof), were 
foremost among the “network of constraints” relevant for public company executives during 
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the 1950s and 1960s.  Discipline arising from corporate rivals was, at least for the moment, of 
secondary importance. 
1. Competition 
Competing firms theoretically could have been a potent feature of the “network of 
constraints” corporate executives had to navigate during the 1950s and 1960s.  There 
certainly was awareness that the fear of losing out to rivals functioned as a disciplinary 
mechanism in the corporate context.  For instance, the 1965 study of institutional investors 
that characterized them as “silent partners” explained a general absence of “corporate 
plundering” partly on the basis that “(w)here competition exists, as it does throughout most of 
the economy, the desire to excel undoubtedly serves to prevent corporate abuse.”107   
While the 1965 study presupposed meaningful competition was the norm throughout 
the American economy, Galbraith disagreed.  Though he acknowledged that “(c)ompetition 
still plays a role” in influencing corporations, he said that, given “the typical modern market 
of few sellers,” it was “not the only or even the typical restraint on the exercise of economic 
power.”108  Berle, Means and numerous other scholars concurred with Galbraith regarding 
competition’s attenuated impact on business decision-making, as they assumed that dominant 
firms vested with considerable market power were standard in the American economy.109  
Similarly, the prevailing view among academics analyzing the 1950s and 1960s 
retrospectively has been that it was commonplace for a small number of powerful companies 
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to dominate an industry.110  For corporate executives of dominant firms operating under 
oligopolistic conditions, the market power from which the corporations would have 
benefitted would have muted considerably the potency of competition as a managerial 
accountability mechanism.  
2. Unions 
In the same way that there was general concurrence with Galbraith that competitive 
pressure rivals imposed was not as potent a constraint on corporations and their executives as 
was theoretically possible, his argument that unions were a meaningful source of 
countervailing power commanded substantial support.  The 1965 study of institutional 
investors that characterized them as silent partners cited the fact that unions were a force to 
be reckoned with as one explanation for the faithful stewardship the vast majority of post-
World War II executives had demonstrated.111  Various contemporaries indeed specifically 
endorsed Galbraith’s views on organized labor.112  His argument that unions were a 
meaningful source of countervailing power with respect to large companies during the mid-
20th century gained adherents subsequently as well.113   
While unions were in the corporate context a meaningful source of countervailing 
power during the 1950s and 1960s, the influence of organized labor operated, as political 
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scientist Michael Reagan observed in 1963, “within a circumscribed scope of affairs and 
where unions exist.”114  As for the “scope of affairs”, key aspects of managerial discretion 
remained unaffected by union power.  Distinguished business historian Alfred Chandler said 
unions  
“directly affected only one set of management decisions – those made by middle 
managers relating to wages, hiring, firing and conditions of work.  Such decisions had 
only an indirect impact on the central ones that coordinated current flows and 
allocated resources for the future.”115 
With the qualification about where unions existed, in the 1950s and 1960s union 
members never made up a majority of the workforce.  Instead, union density (the proportion 
of workers who are unionized) peaked at 35 percent in 1954 and declined steadily to 27 
percent by 1970.116  The impact organized labor had on managerial discretion likely was 
greater than these figures suggest due to non-union firms nervous about unionization 
adjusting their labor relations practices to see off the threat.117  More generally, despite the 
caveats, the endorsements of Galbraith’s analysis of unions indicate executives running large 
firms during the 1950s and 1960s often thought of organized labor as a potent check on their 
managerial prerogatives. 
3. Regulation 
                                                          
114  REAGAN, supra note 112, 145.   
115  ALFRED D. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND:  THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN 
AMERICAN BUSINESS 493 (1977).  
116  GERALD MAYER, UNION MEMBERSHIP TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 22 (2004).  See 
also Figure 2, infra note 146 and accompanying text.  
117  KOTZ, supra note 12, 27; Susan Dynarski, With Solidarity Comes Income Equality, 
NY TIMES, July 8, 2018, Business, 4. 
28 
 
In 1952 Fredrick Lewis Allen, the editor of Harper’s magazine, suggested “the big 
and successful corporation” was “severely circumscribed by government.”118  During the 
heyday of managerial capitalism legislative measures and administrative missives that 
impinged upon public company executives most often targeted single industries.  “Cross-
industry” regulation applicable to corporations generally was not extensive throughout the 
1950s and most of the 1960s.119  There were, however, exceptions.  One was antitrust law, 
which Galbraith specifically cited when describing regulation as a source of countervailing 
power.120   
The federal securities law regime introduced in the mid-1930s, which applied 
generally to corporations with publicly traded securities, was another exception to the 
prevailing pattern of single industry regulation.121  The Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), which was charged with administering the regime, reputedly helped to keep “the 
corporate plutocracy under control through rules and regulations.”122  Compliance with 
disclosure rules federal securities law imposed was similarly seen by contemporaries as “a 
most valuable discipline”123 on the potentially wayward executive because “(h)e was no 
longer a secret deal-maker”124 and “a goldfish has got to be good.”125   
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As for single industry regulation, approximately one-quarter of the economy was 
directly affected during the 1950s and 1960s.126  In key sectors such as telecommunications, 
transport and utilities there was a system of “managed competition” with regulators enforcing 
standards and influencing pricing.127  When industry-specific regulation was in place, prior 
approval was often required to commence operations, markets were frequently segmented by 
product and geography and the need for profits was typically weighed explicitly against the 
public’s interest in safe, fair and reliable service.128  Regulators, when exercising 
administrative discretion available to them, typically pursued policies that were designed to 
foster orderly growth along familiar, predictable lines.129  The emphasis on stability acted as a 
check on those running companies in the industries affected.  Executives tended over time to 
become increasingly averse to risk,130 which would have discouraged freewheeling 
managerial gambles that could end up as scandals if things went awry.   
Commercial banking provides an instructive, if somewhat extreme, example of how 
industry-specific regulation designed to foster orderliness discouraged managerial risk-taking 
during the middle decades of the 20th century.  By virtue of the Banking Act of 1933,131 
supplemented by the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956132 and other measures, commercial 
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banking was one of the most heavily regulated sectors of the U.S. economy.133  Banks, for 
instance, were afforded little scope to carry out business activities unrelated to banking, 
meaning in this context taking deposits and making loans.134  At the same time, bank 
regulation precluded obvious potential competitors -- primarily investment banks subject to 
the strictures of the Glass Steagall Act of 1933 -- from engaging in core aspects of 
commercial banking.135  Federal and state law also ensured banking remained geographically 
fragmented, which served to protect banks from competition within their own industry.136   
Franklin Moore, in a 1964 text on management, underscored the substantial impact 
regulation had on bank executives by characterizing them as “elevator operators, whose 
decisions are closely contained”, as compared with executives in other industries who were 
like ship captains because “they can turn in any direction and go fast and slow.”137  Dynamic, 
aggressive leadership was in turn conspicuous by its absence in the banking sector, with 
safety-first managers being in charge.138  The result was “boring” banking, characterized by 
stable profits and a very low failure rate by historical standards.139  Banking therefore 
illustrated, albeit in a somewhat extreme fashion, how industry-specific regulation could be a 
substantial constraint on managerial discretion during the heyday of managerial capitalism.   
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Regulation functioned as a constraint on public company executives not merely 
because of laws in place but also because of apprehension of further state intervention.  Mid-
20th century executives feared they would assailed as greedy, domineering and grasping in 
the manner their forebears were during the Depression afflicted 1930s, with attendant 
regulatory consequences.140  When Fortune hailed in 1951 “the transformation of American 
capitalism” an important element was that “(o)ne of the most pressing concerns of almost 
every large company today is what people are going to think about it.”141  Adolf Berle argued 
similarly in 1959 “managers of great corporations” had “a corporate conscience” due 
primarily to concerns about violating “the public consensus” where a breach would result in a 
“loss of prestige, public standing and popular esteem” and “the near-certainty of political 
intervention by the State.”142 
The fact that it was not clear how public antipathy towards business might translate 
into government action compromised at least to some degree executive self-restraint based on 
public perceptions of business misconduct.143  Nevertheless, John Kennedy demonstrated in a 
1962 showdown with the steel industry regarding pricing policy the leverage the government 
could exercise in the absence of formal legal authority.144  Kennedy was furious when leading 
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steel companies announced a steel price increase shortly after a potentially debilitating steel 
industry strike had been narrowly averted without a wage hike.  With Kennedy vilifying 
publicly the steel companies that had raised prices, administration officials announced plans 
to launch an investigation into price-fixing in the steel industry and to shift defense purchases 
to companies not planning to charge customers more.  The steel companies which had 
announced they intended to increase prices promptly retreated.  Berle, in a New York Times 
op-ed, maintained that Kennedy’s challenge to the steel industry demonstrated the power of 
big business operated subject to “an unwritten ‘social contract’” under which the government 
could “intervene when economic power in private hands threatens the economic community 
of the United States.”145  Even discounting Berle’s rhetorical flourishes, the steel industry 
incident indicated vividly that in the 1950s and 1960s the mere threat of governmental 
meddling was part of the countervailing power of the state that constrained managerial 
discretion.   
III. COUNTERVAILING POWER RECONFIGURED 
Unions and regulation, as sources of countervailing power that functioned as 
meaningful external constraints on managerial discretion during the 1950s and 1960s, help to 
explain why managerial propriety was very much the norm despite the weakness of internal 
accountability mechanisms.  The potency of countervailing power mechanisms would evolve 
in the decades that followed.  With unions, the trend line was a consistent one:  organized 
labor weakened steadily as a check on public company executives.  As for state intervention 
(or the threat thereof), a deregulatory trend that began in the late 1970s and ran until the 
2000s served to enhance managerial discretion.  This period was preceded and followed, 
however, by marked growth in regulatory activity.  Finally, while competitive pressure from 
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rivals was treated as something of an afterthought during the ostensibly oligopolistic heyday 
of managerial capitalism, it would increase in importance as a source of managerial discipline 
thereafter.    
A. Unions 
Basic data indicate clearly that the power of unions declined markedly following the 
middle decades of the 20th century.  Union density, for instance, fell dramatically (Figure 2).  
The number of major strikes dropped even more sharply (Figure 3).   
Figure 2:  Union Membership as a Percentage of Wage and Salary Workers, 1950-2010 
 
Sources:  Mayer (2004), 1950-72; Unionstats.com, 1973-2010146 
Figure 3:  Work Stoppages Involving 1000 or More Workers, 1950-2010 
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Source:  Bureau of Labor147 
Views expressed by contemporaries confirm the inexorable decline of unions as a 
constraint on managerial discretion.  Lawyers Ira Millstein and Salem Katsh, in a 1981 book 
canvassing limits on corporate power, argued that the process of collective bargaining sharply 
diminished corporate flexibility and said “(t)he power of unions to constrain corporate 
behavior is widely acknowledged.”148  Others were suggesting, however, by the end of the 
1970s that unions were “in disarray”,149 “embattled” and “threatened…by a panoply of 
woes.”150  As for the 1980s the Washington Post said in 1989 it “has been a decade of despair 
for many in the labor movement” and that “(o)rganized labor is in trouble as it marks the end 
of one of its worst decades in postwar history.”151  With the 1990s, Fortune labelled 
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American unions as “hopeless losers” in 1994 and the New York Times said in 1996 that 
“labor faces an uphill fight” and was “on the defensive almost everywhere.”152  
By the 2000s fewer than one out of six workers were members of a union.153  A 2006 
text on the corporation indicated that even when a workforce was unionized, “(t)oday unions 
are not a threat to corporations provided management treats workers with fairness and 
respect.”154  The inexorable decline of organized labor meant that only in exceptional 
situations would unions operate as a meaningful constraint for public company executives.    
B. Regulation 
The 1970s have been described as an era when “(g)overnment regulation…expanded” 
in various ways that placed “limits on managers’ ability to run their firms.”155  This indeed 
was true for most of the decade.  Between 1967 and 1977 Congress enacted “nearly 100 
substantial pieces of legislation affecting the conduct of business.”156  There was also a shift 
in emphasis away from industry-specific regulation in favor of “social” regulation that 
crossed industry lines and defined in relation to a particular facet of economic activity the 
applicable ground rules.157  Regulatory agencies created to administer the statutory measures 
included the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the National Highway Traffic 
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Safety Administration, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission, and the Environmental Protection Agency.158   
In the late 1970s, a continuation of the trend favoring increased regulation of business 
seemed a good bet, given Congress’ recent legislative proclivity, given that control of 
Congress rested in the hands of the usually left-leaning Democrats and given the election of 
Democrat Jimmy Carter as president in 1976.159  In fact, the tide was turning.  The Watergate 
political scandal that prompted Richard Nixon’s 1974 resignation as President, the collapse of 
U.S.-backed South Vietnam in 1975, chronic federal budget deficits and repeated failed 
efforts to bring inflation under control fostered what Newsweek characterized in 1979 as “a 
growing sense that the country’s institutions and leaders were no longer up to managing 
problems that were simply too complex to grasp.”160  Polling data indicated that distrust of 
government intervention grew from 32 percent in 1964 to 50 percent in 1972 and 67 percent 
in 1980.161   
Amidst substantial erosion of support for governmental action, the legislative 
juggernaut launched in the late 1960s stalled.162  The shifting political tides of the late 1970s 
would not merely call a halt to increased regulation, however.  Instead, growing antipathy 
toward government would also act as a catalyst for a deregulation movement that would 
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expand considerably managerial discretion as the 20th century drew to a close.  Deregulation 
is often treated as a core element of Ronald Reagan’s presidential legacy but the push to 
deregulate was well underway by the time he took office in 1981.163  Deregulatory moves 
carried out under the Carter administration included wiping away entry, route and rate 
restrictions in the trucking industry, liberalizing rate setting and route selection for airlines 
and railways, loosening controls on natural gas prices and relaxing interest rate ceilings on 
bank accounts.164   
Ronald Reagan was elected to the presidency in 1980 and a cornerstone of his 
administration was its “four square commitment to deregulation.”165  Legislative change was 
in fact fairly modest.  The Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, which 
further eased restrictions on interest rates payable on bank accounts,166 and the Cable 
Television Act of 1984167 were the only major industry-specific deregulatory measures 
promulgated under Reagan.168  Reagan did achieve, however, meaningful deregulatory results 
by appointing agency and department heads who shared his bias against governmental 
burdens and prioritized lowering compliance costs.169  Newsweek said of the administrative 
tone in 1984 “business seems encouraged by a change in the regulatory climate.  It’s not that 
the absolute level of regulation is expected to decline, but that the rule making has become 
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less capricious.  Executives no longer worry, for example, that a single change in the federal 
air-quality standards might render hundreds of millions of dollars of investment obsolete.”170   
Robert Reich, a Harvard academic who would serve in the Clinton administration in 
the 1990s, claimed in 1985 that due to deregulation “(n)ot since the ‘20s has big business 
been so unconstrained.”171  Reich invoked Galbraith to emphasize his point.  Reich said 
Galbraith had written in the 1950s “reassuringly of the ‘countervailing power’ in the 
American system” but cited cutbacks to regulation when telling readers that “in the America 
of the eighties, these counterweights have been all but removed.”172  While this likely 
overstates the freedom on offer to public companies and their executives, deregulation 
occurring during the late 1970s and the 1980s did afford executives in industries affected 
substantial discretion previously unavailable.  The unravelling of constraints on pricing, 
distribution patterns and product innovation created new opportunities to capture market 
share and generate profits while simultaneously introducing substantial downside risk for 
formerly cossetted incumbents by removing regulatory “safety nets”.173   
The expansion of managerial discretion deregulation precipitated continued when 
Democrat Bill Clinton was elected president in 1992.  Clinton indeed proclaimed in his 1996 
State of the Union address “the era of big government is over.”174  Deregulation was being 
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analogized to a “tidal force” as the 1990s drew to a close.175  Some regard the 1990s as “the 
decade of deregulation.”176 
Throughout much of the 1990s, deregulatory legislation was passed at an energetic 
pace matching that set in the late 1970s.177  The Energy Policy Act of 1992 dismantled 
restrictions on sales of power between utility companies so as to foster competition in a 
sector local monopolies traditionally dominated.178  The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 eliminated most regulatory obstacles to interstate bank 
acquisitions and put in place a national framework for banks to operate across state lines, 
culminating a trend in favor of facilitating multi-state banking various states had begun in the 
late 1970s.179   
In 1995, the Interstate Commerce Commission, which had regulated interstate surface 
transportation since 1887, was shut down but President Clinton still chided Congress for 
failing to back bolder steps to deregulate transportation industries.180  The 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 permitted long distance and local telephone companies, 
such as “Baby Bells” created when erstwhile telephone monopolist AT&T was broken up in 
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1982 as a result of antitrust proceedings, to compete against each other.181  The legislation 
also relaxed restrictions on ownership of television and radio stations and allowed cable 
communication companies and telephone carriers to enter each other’s markets.182  Finally, 
the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act formalized the dismantling of barriers between 
commercial and investment banking the Glass Steagall Act of 1933 had established and 
explicitly authorized the creation of full-service financial holding companies.183   
The state was not in full-scale retreat in the 1990s.  Sociologist Charles Derber 
maintained in 1998 “(g)overnment remains the most important potential countervailing threat 
to corporate power.”184  While Reagan appointees to federal agencies typically shared his bias 
against governmental burdens, Clinton chose personnel intellectually committed to the 
underlying regulatory mission of the agencies they served and the legislation they were 
administering.185  Federal officials also fostered the development of compliance systems 
within corporations by issuing guidelines for prosecution and sentencing of criminal 
violations that contemplated increased penalties for corporate wrongdoing but embraced 
mitigation where an effective compliance program was in place.186  Nevertheless, due to 
deregulation 1990s public company executives often had when exercising managerial 
discretion considerably greater room to move than their managerial capitalism era peers. 
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As the 2000s got underway, it appeared the deregulation trend would continue.  
George W. Bush, in his successful 2000 presidential election campaign, sought to woo 
business community support by promising to continue to scale back federal interference.187  
In fact, the deregulatory momentum reversed in the 2000s, leading the New York Times in 
2005 to harken back to Bill Clinton’s 1996 proclamation on the perilous state of big 
government and declare “(t)he era of big government being over is over.”188   
Events partially dictated the retreat from deregulation.  The terrorist attacks occurring 
on September 11, 2001 prompted Congress to create the Transportation Security 
Administration, the first big new federal bureaucracy set up in more than a quarter century.189  
There were, however, broader pro-regulatory trends at work, evidenced by an inflation-
adjusted 45 percent growth in spending on economic regulatory agencies during the 2000s 
combined with a 12 percent increase in staffing levels.190  This expansion in governmental 
activity chimed with public attitudes.  According to a 2008 poll Americans wanted 
government to “do more to solve problems” by a 53 percent-to-42 percent margin whereas a 
dozen years previously respondents opposed additional government intervention by a 2-to-1 
margin.191   
The trend in favor of regulation continued, and accelerated, when Barack Obama 
became president in 2009.  A total of 486 regulations expected to have an economic impact 
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of $100 million or more were promulgated during the eight years Obama was president, as 
compared with 358 under Bush.192  Moreover, Obama’s “regulations were, on the whole, 
bigger and bolder than what had come before.”193  The New York Times, in a 2016 
retrospective series on the Obama presidency, even labelled him “the Regulator in Chief.”194   
The scaling up of regulation during the Obama administration impinged upon 
managerial discretion in the corporate sector.  Analysis of disclosures by publicly traded 
companies indicated regulatory risk jumped nearly 80 percent across industries between 2010 
and 2015.195  Corporate executives were well aware increased governmental oversight was 
circumscribing options.  Fortune indicated in a 2016 article on regulatory “red tape” that 
“right now the hue and cry from the business community is louder than at just about any time 
in recent memory.”196  The Business Roundtable, an association of chief executives of 
leading public companies, joined those voicing concern.  The introduction to a set of 
corporate governance principles the Business Roundtable issued in 2016 noted “(t)he 
increased regulatory burdens imposed on public companies in recent years have added to the 
costs and complexity of overseeing and managing a corporation’s business and bring new 
challenges from operational, regulatory and compliance perspectives.”197 
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New regulations the Obama administration generated addressed a wide range of 
issues, including health care, the environment and workplace safety.198  Due, however, to the 
Dodd-Frank Act of 2010,199 the primary federal legislative response to the 2008 financial 
crisis, 200 banking was the industry where managerial discretion was most substantially 
compromised.  Even with deregulation occurring in the 1980s and 1990s banking was one of 
the more heavily regulated industries in America.201  Still, bank executives were operating 
with a freedom their managerial capitalism counterparts would have struggled to 
contemplate.  The Economist said of U.S. banks in 2000 that “bank managers, long thought 
of as sober sorts, have, in effect, tried all sorts of ways to turn banking into a high-growth 
business.  They have bought other banks, slashed costs, gone into pastures new and taken 
more risk, in many different guises.”202   
Matters were much different after Dodd-Frank.  Regulators, fortified by their Dodd-
Frank mandate, stepped up considerably their scrutiny of banks, a process characterized by 
the Wall Street Journal in 2017 as “politicians and bureaucrats join(ing) in a remorseless and 
determined effort to tighten regulation.”203  Bankers were well aware of the pattern.  The 
CEO of financial services powerhouse Morgan Stanley agreed when his predecessor 
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suggested in 2013 “(y)our No. 1 client is the government.”204  Analogies in turn were 
regularly drawn between post-financial crisis banks and cautiously run public utilities so as to 
underscore the level of risk aversion.205  Banking thus exemplified how regulation had 
emerged since the early 2000s as an increasingly potent constraint on managerial discretion.   
C. Competition 
Due to oligopolistic market conditions assumed to prevail widely during the heyday 
of managerial capitalism in the 1950s and 1960s pressure from market rivals was treated as a 
secondary element in the world of countervailing power.206  Perceptions of competition as an 
external accountability mechanism would change considerably in the ensuing decades.  There 
was a foreign dimension involved.  As the 1970s drew to a close rivals from abroad were 
outflanking American corporations with sufficient regularity to prompt debate in the U.S. on 
the topic of national competitiveness.207   
Unions were among those feeling the pinch as foreign competition ramped up.  
Market power large corporations had in the 1950s and 1960s created “slack” that left room 
for concessions to unions.208  Employers pressured by foreign rivals in the 1970s realized 
they could no longer simply pass increased labor costs along to consumers and dug their 
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heels in.209  Organized labor in turn found itself under an onus to accommodate management, 
at least to some degree.  The United Automobile Workers, for example, acknowledged in 
1979 that it agreed “to a cheap contract” with Chrysler because the automaker, put on the 
back foot by foreign competitors, was “threatened with bankruptcy.”210  Correspondingly, the 
development of pressure from rivals into a more potent source of countervailing power 
fostered a simultaneous trend in the opposite direction with unions. 
Moving into the 1980s, the overseas challenge continued to preoccupy executives 
running domestic firms.  Business Week said in 1987 there was “a new, hard nosed approach 
to business in the U.S.” with “the leanest and meanest” offering “America’s best shot at 
turning back a tide of foreign competition.”211  The growth in competitive pressure in the 
1980s also had a substantial domestic component.  Entrepreneurial values were being lauded 
in a way that was novel for the post-World War II era.212  This provided a congenial setting 
for the growth of companies that could and would challenge powerful incumbents, such as 
Harvard drop-out Bill Gates and Microsoft stealing a march on information technology 
behemoth IBM with respect to the development of computer operating systems.213  
Deregulation also was a catalyst for the challenging of heretofore dominant firms, at least in 
the industries specifically targeted.214  A Business Week columnist said in 1987 the policy had 
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“exposed managerial complacency and inefficient practices caused by years of shelter from 
market forces.”215   
The disciplinary effect of challenges by rivals grew further in the 1990s.  Joel Klein, 
head of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division, claimed in 1998 that “our economy is 
more competitive today than it has been in a long, long time.”216  Management theorist Gary 
Hamel captured evocatively fears competitors were eliciting in the corporate ranks, saying in 
1999 “(f)ace it:  Out there in some garage, an entrepreneur is forging a bullet with your 
company’s name on it.  Once that bullet leaves the barrel, you won’t be able to dodge it.”217   
The tribulations of various well-known corporations provided anecdotal evidence 
confirming conjectures about increased competitive pressure.  “All around us we hear the 
thuds of dinosaur organizations hitting the decks” management professor Thomas Vollmann 
declared in 1996.218  “The most visible hulks in Dinosaurland” included erstwhile corporate 
icons such as General Motors, IBM, Sears and Kodak.219  Awareness of competitive pressure 
in turn affected the managerial mind-set.  Marina von Neumann Whitman, a business school 
professor and former General Motors executive, argued in 1999 that for executives “(i)ntense 
competitive pressures” were diluting “the concentration of managerial power” and had 
“reduced managerial complacency.”220   
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The rise of the internet in the 1990s was a significant reason why public company 
executives felt pressure from rivals was intensifying as the 20th century drew to a close.  
Business Week picked up on the theme in a 1999 cover story entitled “Internet Anxiety”:  
“Simply put, there’s a revolution under way, and mastering the Net has moved front 
and center on Corporate America’s agenda….Throughout Corporate America, 
executives are suddenly waking to the realization that those who don’t move fast to 
get in on the game risk having their lunch eaten by tiny rivals who may have barely 
existed just a few years ago.” 221 
Those in charge of corporations dominant within a market sector were apprehensive of the 
internet primarily because it was suddenly much easier for buyers and sellers to find each 
other and for customers to engage in comparison shopping for the best deal.222   
Competitors remained a headache for public company management during the 2000s.  
With respect to foreign rivals, China’s growing strength was drawing considerable 
attention.223  For instance, a 2006 study of public company executives warned “the current 
global economy has little patience for companies that can’t ‘hack it’” and that “ (t)he Asian 
tigers are back, fiercer than before, now that China is among them.”224   
On the domestic front, the ongoing growth of the internet continued to bolster firms 
seeking to challenge dominant incumbents.  A 2011 study of the evolution of management 
theory indicated, for instance, “(t)he internet has made it easier for Davids to take on 
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Goliaths.” 225  This, in turn, had “forced established Goliaths to improve their game.”226  
Robert Reich even suggested in 2007 that “supercapitalism” had taken hold in the U.S., 
characterized by “ever more intensifying competition among businessmen.”227  Reich’s 
nomenclature may have been somewhat hyperbolic but competition from rivals clearly was a 
substantially more robust managerial constraint than was the case in Galbraith’s era.   
IV. INTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS FORTIFIED 
The operation of unions and regulation as sources of countervailing power help to 
explain why the 1950s and 1960s were an era of managerial propriety despite neither boards 
nor shareholders constraining managerial discretion substantially.  As Part III indicated, both 
unions and regulation receded in importance as accountability mechanisms as the 20th century 
drew to a close.  Given the separation of ownership and control that had become and would 
remain a characteristic of public companies,228 there correspondingly was potentially wide 
scope for managerial waywardness.  Intensifying competition between firms was a partial 
counterbalance.   
A strengthening of internal accountability mechanisms also helped to keep late 20th 
century public company executives in check.  The process began in earnest in the 1970s with 
boards, with changes often being discussed in terms of improving corporate governance.  
Stockholders were slower off the mark but the continuation of a shift in favor of institutional 
ownership at the expense of retail investors ultimately served to bolster shareholder 
monitoring capabilities.  A by-product would be that a managerial shift of priorities in favor 
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of the promotion of shareholder value a wave of hostile takeovers in the 1980s prompted 
would be sustained when the takeover activity abated.  Neither boards nor shareholders, 
however, functioned optimally as internal accountability mechanisms, as illustrated by high-
profile examples of managerial malfeasance in the early 2000s.   
A. Boards of Directors 
The 1970s opened with a corporate collapse that illustrated starkly the weakness of 
boards as an accountability mechanism.  Penn Central was the product of a merger between 
the Pennsylvania Railroad and the New York Central railway, with discussions of 
consolidation extending back to the late 1950s climaxing in 1968 when the U.S. Supreme 
Court gave the green light.229  Just two years later Penn Central was in crisis.  Bankruptcy 
proceedings involving Penn Central’s railway assets would end up being the largest in history 
to that point.230  Prior to the collapse, Penn Central was a “management mess”, with a 
chairman of the board who was more interested in real estate holdings acquired as part of a 
diversification plan than in railways, a chief executive officer who was ignored and a railway 
network plagued by mis-routings and other foul ups.231  The Penn Central board was asleep at 
the switch throughout.232  One director admitted that the board was little more than a “rubber 
stamp” and provided a “horrible example”.233   
Revelations of corporate impropriety would extend beyond Penn Central before long.  
The Watergate Special Prosecutor’s Office successfully prosecuted nearly 20 companies for 
violating campaign finance laws in relation to the 1972 presidential election, meaning the 
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Watergate scandal shook public confidence in the business community as well as 
politicians.234  During the mid-1970s dozens of U.S. public corporations revealed under a 
voluntary disclosure scheme the SEC had established that they had made illegal or 
questionable foreign payments during the first half of the decade.235  In many of these 
companies one or more members of senior management knew of or approved the illicit 
practices but the outside directors were uniformly ignorant of what was going on.236  This 
represented, according to the SEC, “frustration of our system of corporate accountability.”237  
As concerns about managerial waywardness increased during the 1970s the term 
“corporate governance” moved into the limelight as it was deployed for the first time with 
regularity in newspapers, academic journals and other publications.238  This was accompanied 
by changes in the boardroom oriented around fortifying the board’s role in monitoring 
management.239  For instance, at the SEC’s urging, the New York Stock Exchange amended 
its listing rules in 1977 to make the establishment of an audit committee comprised of outside 
directors a condition of listing.240   
Before the 1970s drew to a close public company executives were themselves 
acknowledging that it was sound practice for outside directors to be well-represented on 
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boards and for certain key board tasks to be delegated to committees outside directors 
dominated.241  Companies were in turn reconfiguring their boards voluntarily to foster 
monitoring of management.  Among 270 major industrial, transportation and distribution 
companies the proportion of board seats held by full-time executives dropped from 54 
percent in 1970 to 43 percent in 1980.242   
Voluntary change was prevalent as well with board committees.  According to 
Conference Board data relating to large industrial companies the proportion with an audit 
committee increased from 19 percent in 1967 and 45 percent in 1972 to 93 percent just prior 
to the NYSE changing its listing rules.243  The proportion which had set up compensation 
committees to deal with the delicate issue of executive pay rose from 57 percent to 72 percent 
and to 90 percent over the same period.244  While only 7 percent of public companies in 1972 
had a nomination committee in place to select candidates for directorships, this figure 
increased to 29 percent in 1979, including 38 percent of companies listed on the NYSE.245  
With respect to the reconfiguring of boards, in the 1980s “the 1970s 
trend…continued, although more slowly.”246  By the early 1990s it seemed boards had come 
into their own as a monitoring mechanism.  Dismissals of CEOs at prominent companies 
such as Goodyear, Westinghouse, American Express, General Motors, IBM, and Kodak 
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provided high-profile evidence of change in the boardroom.247  The pattern appeared to be 
sustained through the remainder of the decade.  Jay Lorsch, author of a 1989 book on boards 
entitled Pawns and Potentates,248 suggested in 2001 that during the 1980s directors “were 
more like the pawns.  Today they are more like the potentates.”249  Law professor Ronald 
Gilson similarly asserted “Directors are now energized.”250 
Such optimism concerning boards proved to be somewhat premature.  In the early 
2000s, sizeable public companies such as Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia Communications and 
Tyco were laid low by major scandals.  Amidst a sharp jump in media coverage of corporate 
governance,251 boards were identified as major culprits.252  Forbes said in 2003 of major 
scandal-afflicted public companies “(a)ll had boards of directors that looked the other way 
while their chief executives ran roughshod over the auditing committees and often fattened 
their personal bank accounts while the businesses fell apart.”253   
Policymakers concurred that the scandals demonstrated there were problems in the 
boardroom and acted accordingly.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), which was the 
primary regulatory response to the managerial misfeasance, mandated the establishment of 
audit committees composed entirely of independent directors.254  The same year the New 
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York Stock Exchange promulgated listing rules that required listed companies to have boards 
with at least a majority of independent directors and to have nomination and compensation 
committees staffed exclusively by independent directors.255  NYSE rival NASDAQ adopted 
similar if somewhat less exacting requirements.256   
There was optimism following the adoption of SOX that boards had evolved into 
reliable monitors of public company executives.  Alan Murray, in his 2007 book Revolt in the 
Boardroom, said due to post-scandal changes “CEOs had to take their boards much more 
seriously” and directors, “no longer handpicked” by the chief executive, were “acting with 
new energy” as part of a “shift in power from the chief executive’s office to the corporate 
boardroom.”257  Boards were not yet functioning optimally, however.  They were singled out 
for criticism, for instance, when the financial crisis of 2008 hit, with bank directors being 
accused of helping to bring on the crisis by failing to keep freewheeling executives in 
check.258  Nevertheless, boards, as compared with their counterparts in the 1950s and 1960s, 
were operating as a considerably more robust accountability mechanism.   
B. Shareholders 
While the retail investors who collectively dominated share ownership during the 
managerial capitalism era were ill-suited to engage in activism, during the 1970s and 1980s 
institutional investors better situated to intervene due to their “power and sophistication” 259 
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were steadily displacing retail investors as share owners (Figure 4).  This trend did not yield a 
marked change in practice, however, with the intensity of shareholder monitoring.  
Investment managers acting on behalf of institutional shareholders feared intervening in the 
affairs of an underperforming company was unlikely to be worthwhile.  Activism was 
thought to be a potentially costly, disruptive and time-consuming endeavor that was unlikely, 
in the event of success, to have a significant beneficial impact on an investment portfolio 
comprising dozens of stocks.260  Also, regulation, such as rules putting investment funds 
under an onus to diversify their holdings, created obstacles for institutional investors perhaps 
otherwise inclined to engage in activism.261   
Figure 4:  U.S. Corporate Stock Held by Households and Institutions, 1970-1990 
 
Source:  OECD (1996)262 
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During the 1990s institutional investors generally continued to shy away from taking 
on a substantial “hands on” corporate governance role.263  Their actions, however, helped to 
ensure indirectly that the generation of shareholder value was sustained as a top priority for 
public company executives.  During the 1950s and 1960s, it was widely assumed that 
shareholders were merely one constituency among several executives would take into 
account, with the interests of employees, suppliers and customers also being crucial.264  A 
wave of hostile takeovers in the 1980s moved stockholders up the priority list as the fate of 
management hinged to an unprecedented degree on shareholder perceptions of the 
capabilities of incumbent executives.265   
Hostile takeover activity fell off markedly as the 1990s began.266  Apprehension 
ensued that managerial accountability would erode, particularly in relation to shareholders.267  
Institutional investors, mindful of the need for substitute strategies to motivate management 
to focus on shareholder interests, lobbied the corporate sector successfully to displace a 
traditional bias toward linking levels of executive pay with the size of the company involved 
in favor of correlating compensation with stockholder returns.268  Public company executives 
in turn became preoccupied with the earnings of the companies they were running, knowing 
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that failure to match investor expectations could “kill a stock” and thereby preclude pay-outs 
under potentially lucrative performance-oriented compensation schemes.269   
The predilection for passivity affecting “mainstream” institutional shareholders did 
not change markedly in the 2000s.  When corporate scandals struck at the beginning of the 
decade, institutional investors were criticized for being “sleeping giants” that were 
“shockingly indifferent to bad management” and for standing by when it should have been 
evident that boards were not up to scratch.270  As the financial crisis of 2008 mounted asset 
managers acting on behalf of major institutional shareholders generally prized stability and 
correspondingly refrained from rocking the boat even in companies seemingly poised to 
suffer major financial setbacks.271 
While mainstream institutional shareholders retained their bias in favor of passivity 
from the 1970s through to the 2000s, shareholder pressure on public company executives 
would intensify following 2000.  This was due to hedge funds coming to prominence that 
specialized in targeting underperforming companies and lobbying for changes to boost 
shareholder returns.272  The modus operandi of the sub-set of hedge funds that engaged in 
activism was to accumulate quietly a sizeable strategic holding, make proposals that 
management unlock shareholder value by off-loading weak divisions, distributing cash to 
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shareholders or even selling the company, and then count on support from other shareholders 
to maximize pressure on management.273   
In 2001, the Wall Street Journal drew attention to the fact “hedge-fund managers, 
who historically have been relatively passive” were beginning to push “companies to find 
new ways to unlock shareholder value.”274  Activist hedge funds then rocketed to governance 
prominence.  The New York Times indicated in 2007 “a wide-ranging, merry band of hedge 
fund managers have risen to power by holding their poison pens to the throats of corporate 
executives and directors” with the results being “staggering:  activists have put dozens of 
companies, large and small, into play and helped prop up the stock price of dozens of 
others.”275  Hedge funds were characterized in 2008 as “the newest big thing in corporate 
governance.”276  In a 2010 law review article where law professors Marcel Kahan and 
Edward Rock described U.S. chief executives as “embattled” they cited hedge fund activism 
as a cause in addition to reforms concerning independent directors that resulted in CEOs 
losing power to boards.277 
V. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND COUNTERVAILING POWERS TODAY 
From the 1970s through to the opening decade of the 2000s, internal accountability 
mechanisms in public companies strengthened, albeit fitfully.  Boards were restructured in a 
manner that reinforced their monitoring capabilities and shareholders edged away from their 
bias in favor of passivity, especially with the arrival of hedge fund activists.  One might infer 
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from these trends that, consistent with a corporate governance predilection to focus on 
“internal” accountability mechanisms,278 “external” constraints on managerial discretion were 
destined to become a mere afterthought.  At present, however, it is open to question whether 
the trend in favor of boards and shareholders exerting greater control over public company 
executives will continue.  Correspondingly, for the foreseeable future “external” constraints 
are destined to remain an important determinant of the scope of managerial discretion.  At the 
same time, though, with each of the countervailing powers we have considered – unions, 
pressure from rivals and regulation – there is reason to doubt in the near- to medium-term 
their potency as a check on managerial discretion.   
A. Internal Accountability Mechanisms 
While since the mid-20th century boards have evolved in a manner that has facilitated 
their monitoring capabilities, there may well be little scope for further movement in that 
direction.  Board reform remains a topic for debate, but the emphasis has begun to shift to 
different objectives.  As for shareholders, hedge fund activists, who emerged as significant 
corporate governance players in the 2000s, may be in a position similar to boards in that they 
appear not to have much new to add with respect to fostering managerial accountability.  
Otherwise, the growing popularity of investment in funds that track well-known stock market 
indices may well bolster executive autonomy due to a bias in favor of passivity on the part of 
these index trackers.   
1. Boards 
Board reform was part of the financial crisis-driven reform package the Dodd-Frank 
Act of 2010 introduced but circumstances muted the impact of leading changes.  For instance, 
a measure mandating that stock exchange listing rules require that publicly traded companies 
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have an independent compensation committee was largely superfluous because NYSE listing 
rules already imposed this requirement and the NASDAQ listing rules were structured 
similarly.279  In addition, a 2011 judicial ruling striking down a draft SEC regulation rendered 
at least temporarily moot a Dodd Frank provision affirming that the SEC could promulgate a 
“proxy access” rule giving dissident stockholders seeking board representation the 
opportunity to use the proxy documentation their corporations circulate to communicate to 
their fellow shareholders.280   
Despite factors muting Dodd-Frank’s impact on boards, “(t)o a significant extent, the 
dreams of yesterday’s corporate governance advocates have come true.”281  The monitoring 
model of the board that achieved notoriety in the 1970s implied that outside directors should 
substantially outnumber executives on the board and that boards should establish audit, 
compensation and nomination committee staffed by such directors.282  This is what we 
currently see.  As of 2017, 85 percent of directors of S&P 500 companies qualified as 
“independent”, up from 80 percent in 2007.283  Partly due to reforms introduced in the early 
2000s by SOX and by stock exchanges that went a considerable distance toward making 
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audit, compensation and nomination committees staffed by independent directors 
mandatory,284 such committees are now essentially universal in large public companies.285   
Incentives directors have to monitor executives may well have been bolstered by 
changes corporations have made to director election procedures that reputedly have “handed 
investors the keys” to public company boardrooms.286  There was during the 2000s a 
substantial move away from “staggered” boards that can delay the assumption of control by 
an insurgent shareholder with sufficient voting clout to a win a proxy contest for board 
seats.287  The trend has continued, with only 24 percent of S&P 500 companies having 
staggered boards in 2011 and just 8 percent in 2017.288  Similarly, the proportion of S&P 500 
companies with “majority” rather than “plurality” voting, meaning a nominee has to obtain a 
majority of votes cast to be elected even when running unopposed, stood at 89 percent in 
2018 as compared with 16 percent in 2006.289  While the 2011 judicial ruling on proxy access 
was a setback for the SEC, more than three out of five S&P 500 companies have changed 
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their by-laws to introduce the procedure for significant shareholders, up from about 21 
percent in early 2016 and just 1 percent in 2014.290   
Anecdotally, structural changes affecting boards have been matched by changes in 
practice bolstering the effectiveness of boards as monitors of executives.  Rav Gupta, a 
former CEO of a Fortune 500 chemical concern and an outside director of additional Fortune 
500 companies, maintained in 2016 “we have moved the needle a lot in the last 15 years”, 
emphasizing “‘radical change’ in the boardroom” since the financial crisis.291  The New York 
Times suggested in 2017 boards “have changed, evolving from country club like collections 
of the same familiar faces into a much more diverse and demanding constituency.”292 
While boards’ monitoring capabilities have improved, calls for additional boardroom 
reform will no doubt continue.  There are concerns that “(m)any boards lack the time 
necessary to fulfill their monitoring obligations and oversee management.”293  With women 
holding not even one out of four S&P 500 directorships, fostering increased diversity in the 
boardroom stands out as an obvious priority.294  The case has also been made that boards 
should move beyond monitoring and take on a leadership role by actively partnering with 
management in the formulation of corporate strategy.295  
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While board reform is destined to remain on the agenda, there appears to be little 
additional scope for boards to be restructured to constrain management through monitoring.  
With independent directors dominating boards, with the board committees assumed to be 
crucial from a governance perspective being all but universal and with shareholders minded 
to turf out underperforming directors having increased theoretical scope to do so, there are 
few obvious moves left to upgrade the board’s capacity to scrutinize executive behavior.  The 
fact that outside directors are part-timers imposes inevitable limitations on their ability to act 
as corporate watchdogs, but reputedly boards work noticeably harder than they used to.296  
Hence, it seems unlikely that boards will operate as a markedly more robust check on 
corporate executives in the future than they do currently. 
2. Shareholders  
Hedge funds, as “the newest big thing in corporate governance”, bolstered 
considerably the potency of shareholder-related constraints on managerial behavior during 
the 2000s.297  The turmoil associated with the 2008 financial crisis posed challenges for 
hedge fund activists but interventions continued, albeit not quite as frequently as during the 
mid-2000s.298  Hedge fund activism then went into overdrive as the 2010s got underway, with 
academics Jack Coffee and Darius Palia saying in 2016 it had “recently spiked, almost 
hyperbolically.”299   
A by-product of the work of the hedge fund provocateurs has been to nudge 
mainstream institutional shareholders -- “America’s lazy money” -- at least partially off the 
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sidelines.300  Since hedge fund activists only acquire minority stakes in companies they 
target, they know management can ignore them unless other shareholders are sympathetic.  
During the 2000s, hedge funds proved quite successful in rallying major institutional 
investors to back their dissident campaigns.301  This continued as the 2010s got underway.  
Mainstream institutional investors were often favorably disposed toward hedge fund 
interventions and institutional backing in its turn frequently represented sufficient voting 
power to swing around otherwise recalcitrant executives of targeted companies.302  The 
result, according to law professors Ronald Gilson and Jeff Gordon, was a “happy 
complementarity” resulting in “better monitoring” that lowered managerial agency costs and 
in “governance markets” becoming “more complete.”303  
Though hedge funds have fostered more intense monitoring of public company 
executives, hedge fund activism may also have reached an inflection point marking the end of 
the upward trajectory that began in the early 2000s.304  Public company executives, realizing 
they can end up on the back foot once a hedge fund activist arrives, are increasingly taking 
advance precautions.  Reputedly, “‘think like an activist’ has become a boardroom mantra as 
companies strive to anticipate potential hedge fund demands and address perceived 
weaknesses.”305  Numerous companies have, for instance, been engaging in activist “fire 
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drills”, identifying areas of vulnerability and making changes so as to try to forestall a hedge 
fund foray.306  With public companies reading the activism playbook and taking anticipatory 
measures, hedge funds seem to be pulling back as they realize there are fewer instances 
where intervening will add value.307  The number of activist forays indeed declined 
substantially in 2016 and 2017 as compared to 2014 and 2015, particularly among large 
public companies.308    
Data for the first few months of 2018 suggest the decline in hedge fund interventions 
may have ended, at least temporarily.309  Another trend, however, should, if it persists, 
preclude a meaningful enduring surge in hedge fund activism.  Activist hedge funds have, on 
average, been delivering poor returns lately.310  Perhaps with public company executives 
endeavoring to think like activists there are now few instances where underperformance is 
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sufficiently egregious for intervention to yield bumper returns.  Whatever the explanation, 
investors, disappointed with results activist hedge funds have been delivering, have begun 
taking their money out of the sector, a trend that inevitably would throw the brakes on activist 
hedge fund growth if it continues in earnest.311  Hedge fund activism thus appears to be 
stalling, even if there is no full-scale retreat on the horizon.   
If in fact a ceiling is coming into view for hedge fund activism, the stance taken by 
pension funds and mutual funds, as mainstream institutional investors, will dictate the extent 
to which shareholder pressure continues to strengthen as a managerial accountability 
mechanism.  Generally speaking their bias in favor of passivity continues.312  Investment 
bankers Joseph Perella and Peter Weinberg have argued, for example, “the big shareholders, 
the institutional shareholders who invest for pension funds and the like, need to stop being 
silent and speak out.”313  Without a change in this regard, shareholder action may well have 
peaked as a constraint on managerial discretion. 
While the basic reticent stance of mainstream institutional shareholders remains 
unchanged there is a recent twist in the plot of which account must be taken.  A dramatic 
increase in the popularity of “passive” index tracking funds has reportedly resulted in “a 
concentration of ownership not seen since the days of the Rockefeller Trust” oriented around 
Standard Oil at the turn of the 20th century.314  Reputedly, the “passive funds are the new king 
of our capital markets” and their growth “is transforming the governance landscape.”315  
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Big index tracker funds drive down fees investors pay by exploiting economies of 
scale and by deploying a plain vanilla investment approach, namely matching the 
performance of a stock market index such as the S&P 500.316  For instance, the expense ratio 
for the main S&P tracker fund which the Vanguard Group operates is 0.04 percent of the 
fund’s assets, as compared with 0.8 percent for the average actively managed mutual fund.317  
The logic of index tracking funds has been winning over investors.  Fresh investment meant 
the proportion of the S&P 500 owned by U.S.-based index trackers increased from 4.6 
percent in 2005 to 13.9 percent in 2017.318 
The three largest U.S.-based asset management firms, BlackRock, Vanguard, and 
State Street, dominate the rapidly growing index tracking industry.319  With a substantial 
majority of the equity under management of each of “the Big Three” being invested in a 
passive manner,320 the dramatic growth of index tracking has meant their stakes in public 
companies have increased substantially recently.  Vanguard’s passive funds alone held a 
stake of 5 percent or more in 468 S&P 500 companies as of 2016, up from just three in 
2005.321  The proportion of S&P 500 companies where BlackRock, Vanguard, and State 
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Street combined would constitute the largest shareholder increased from 25 percent in 2000 
to 88 percent in 2015.322   
The large collective stake the Big Three hold in U.S. public companies has been 
referred to as “(a)n economic blockbuster” that “has recently been exposed.”323  Rhetoric 
deployed by key index trackers imply closer scrutiny of management is accompanying the 
ownership shift.  BlackRock CEO Larry Fink, who reputedly wants “to be the conscience of 
Corporate America,”324 maintains “(t)he time has come for a new model of shareholder 
engagement— one that strengthens and deepens communication between shareholders and 
the companies that they own.”325  Similarly Glenn Booraem, a Vanguard principal and head 
of investment stewardship, has said its funds seek to be “passive investors but active 
owners.”326  Booraem reasons Vanguard and other investment firms operating index tracking 
funds must exercise their voices because with the level of investment in companies being pre-
determined by the market “(w)e’re riding in a car we can’t get out of” and “(g)overnance is 
the seat belt and air bag.’”327   
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Consistent with BlackRock and Vanguard’s rhetoric, the Big Three have added staff 
recently to deal with governance and stewardship.328  Nevertheless, each of the firms is 
poorly situated to impinge substantially on the discretion of public company executives.  
BlackRock’s governance team is comprised of around 35 employees tasked with overseeing 
the 14,000 companies in which BlackRock owns shares.329  Vanguard has just over 20 people 
for its 13,000 companies and State Street has approximately a dozen for its 9,000.330  The 
governance teams of the Big Three carry out dozens of engagements each year with 
executives of companies in which their index tracking funds own shares.331  Nevertheless, 
with most portfolio companies it is not feasible to arrange a meeting even annually.332  The 
head of corporate governance for State Street’s asset management funds has told her team 
that because of time constraints they should not agree to every meeting company executives 
might request.333  Public company executives notice.  A CEO told the Financial Times in 
2017 “(w)e’d love to talk to the passive guys, they control 20 per cent of our shares, but they 
don’t want to see us.”334 
Given the modest amount of direct contact between the Big Three indexers and public 
companies in which they own shares, anything approaching the sort of firm-specific 
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meddling in which activist hedge funds engage is unrealistic.  BlackRock’s head of corporate 
governance has acknowledged “(i)t’s not the shareholders’ role to second guess what 
management is doing in every single issue.”335  More broadly, index trackers, given their 
business model, are unlikely to emerge as vigilant monitors of public company executives 
any time soon.  Any highly diversified investment fund will have a bias in favor of passivity 
because of the costs associated with activism and because a successful intervention is 
unlikely to have a significant impact on stock portfolios encompassing numerous 
companies.336  Index tracker funds have particularly weak incentives to act as engaged 
shareholders.337  Operators of tracker funds do not compete over the performance of the index 
they are set up to mimic, which is taken as a given, and instead focus on keeping costs as low 
as possible and on eliminating tracking errors.338  Correspondingly, if those running an index 
fund expend meaningful resources to identify and correct underperformance in particular 
companies, any gains will be shared with the market at large, fees will increase and market 
share will likely be lost rapidly to cheaper, fully passive rivals in an industry where fee 
competition has a significant effect on investor inflows.339   
Only time will tell exactly what corporate governance role BlackRock, Vanguard and 
State Street will assume.340  At present, though, it is unlikely that the growth of passive 
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indexers will substantially compromise existing managerial prerogatives in public companies 
in the foreseeable future.  If in addition there has been an inflection point with hedge fund 
activism marking the end of its upward trajectory, then, as with boards, shareholders are 
unlikely to operate as a markedly more robust check on corporate executives any time soon.   
B. External Accountability Mechanisms 
This article has already achieved its two core objectives.  First, the analysis of 
managerial accountability in the 1950s and 1960s has shown that external mechanisms – 
sources of countervailing power -- can play a substantial role in constraining the discretion of 
public company executives.  Second, the historical overview of internal accountability 
mechanisms, traced forward to the present day, has revealed that while boards and 
shareholder action have developed into considerably more potent checks on executive 
discretion than they were during the heyday of managerial capitalism limits are coming 
clearly into view.  Hence, for the foreseeable future external constraints are destined to 
remain an important determinant of the scope of managerial discretion.   
While the core ideas underpinning this article have now been developed, the reader 
should not be left guessing as to the current state of play with governance-related sources of 
countervailing power John Kenneth Galbraith identified in the 1950s.  As we will see now, 
unions remain an afterthought.  With regulation, there has been something of a deregulatory 
revival under the Trump presidency but governmental rule-making should remain a 
meaningful constraint for public company executives for the foreseeable future.  Finally, 
while pressure from rivals emerged as a potent external constraint on managerial discretion as 
the 20th century drew to a close, concerns are emerging that various large firms are 
accumulating sufficient market power to preclude meaningful challenges by rivals.   
1. Unions 
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Following the managerial capitalism era, unions receded steadily in importance as a 
variable with which management had to be concerned.341  Organized labor’s decline has not 
been reversed lately.  Union density slumped to 10.7 percent of the workforce in 2016, an all-
time low, and remained unchanged in 2017.342  With private sector employers, only 6.5 
percent of workers were unionized in 2017, a proportion just fractionally above the all-time 
low of 6.4 percent in 2016.343  Strike activity has continued to decline as well.  Between 2010 
and 2017 there was an average of 14 major work stoppages annually, a decline from the 
already historically low rate of 20 per year in the 2000s.344    
A marked improvement in organized labor’s fortunes seems unlikely.  In the private 
sector context an ideal setting to put collective bargaining in place is a large workplace 
staffed by a sizeable contingent of full-time employees.345  This arrangement, however, has 
become very much the exception to the rule with employers depending heavily on automation 
and outsourcing to economize on labor costs.346  Continued antipathy towards unions in the 
southern U.S. and in sectors such as high-tech and restaurants has also hamstrung organized 
labor.347  The upshot is that unions are unlikely to return soon as a highly relevant constraint 
for public company executives. 
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2. Regulation 
A late 20th century trend in favor of deregulation which had bolstered the discretion 
available to public company executives ended in the 2000s.348  Regulatory pressure on 
business intensified during Barack Obama’s presidency.349  A double back in favor of 
deregulation appears to be underway with Donald Trump.  Astute political clairvoyance 
would be needed to predict accurately the legacy of this latest change of course.    
Post-financial crisis bankers dialled back risk in response to new regulations, 
primarily associated with the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.350  For many 
apprehensive about dangers the financial sector pose to the wider economy, the trend has 
been welcome but does not suffice.  The fear is that the intensity of regulatory supervision 
will weaken as the 2008 crisis fades from memory, opening the door for banks to return to 
destructive free-wheeling pre-financial crisis ways.351  The solution put forward by various 
critics of mega-banks has been to break them up.  For instance, in 2013 and again in 2015 
Senators Elizabeth Warren and John McCain co-sponsored bills proposing a restoration of the 
Glass Steagall split between commercial and investment banking activities.352  Neither bill 
made substantial headway but the 2016 Republican and Democratic Party platforms both 
called for reinstatement of the Glass Steagall Act.353  Political discussion of bank breakups 
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continued after the election.  Donald Trump said in a 2017 interview “(t)here’s some people 
that want to go back to the old system, right?  So we’re going to look at that.”354 
The tougher regulation of banks that would be involved with a break-up would be out 
of character for a Trump administration that has thus far adopted a deregulatory orientation.  
Trump said on the campaign trail in 2016 “I would say 70 percent of regulations can go.  It’s 
just stopping businesses from growing.”355  A year into his presidency, Trump claimed“(w)e 
have undertaken the most extensive regulatory reduction ever conceived.”356  In fact, cases 
where active regulations have been stripped clean off the books have been rare.357  
Nevertheless, rule-making has tailed off dramatically.358  Executive orders and executive 
branch agency directives have additionally scaled back numerous planned regulatory 
actions.359  Critics of regulation favorably disposed toward a lighter touch approach have also 
been appointed to lead several federal agencies.360  Somewhat quixotically, given Trump’s 
bank breakup ruminations, the supervisory style of banking regulators has become less 
abrasive and the Treasury Department has spelled out plans for adopting a relaxed stance in 
the many areas where Dodd Frank offers discretion.361  Then again, Trump did call Dodd-
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Frank a “disaster”, vowed after taking office to “do a big number” on it and indicated 
overregulation had left the financial industry “devastated and unable to properly serve the 
public.”362 
It is unclear at present whether the deregulatory push by the Trump administration 
will constitute a mere hiatus in a larger pro-regulatory trend or is the beginning of a 
deregulation pattern akin to that in operation as the 20th century came to a close.363  Future 
election results will likely do much to dictate which direction things go.  Absent an unlikely 
wholesale regulatory bonfire, however, governmental rule-making should remain a 
meaningful constraint for public company executives for the foreseeable future.   
C. Competition 
As the 21st century got underway, it appeared to some that intensifying competition in 
the economy had evolved into a form of “supercapitalism”.364  The competitive pressure 
businesses face is still widely hyped.  On the other hand, the influence wielded by powerful 
incumbents, particularly in the tech sector, is capturing attention to an extent unknown since 
the managerial capitalism era ended.    
A popular theory is that “business is more competitive than ever”, which translates 
into “a hyper-competitive world in which established giants are constantly being felled by the 
forces of disruption.”365  A team of analysts from the influential management consultancy 
McKinsey wrote in 2016 “(i)ncumbents that have long focused on perfecting their industry 
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value chains are often stunned to find new entrants introducing completely different ways to 
make money”, meaning “many business leaders live in a heightened state of alert.”366  As was 
the case both in the late 1990s and the 2000s, the internet is seen as a primary catalyst for 
intensifying competition.367  With the popularity of smartphones expanding the internet’s 
reach and with apps making it easier to reach consumers directly,368 in the words of Google 
economist Hal Varian, “(c)ompetition is a click away, so competitive advantage can erode 
quickly.”369  Accordingly, then, cumbersome “corporate giants increasingly struggle with the 
competition from highly networked and agile startup companies.”370 
The development of computer-based technology that facilitates the sharing of 
information and ideas via virtual networks is a related technical innovation fostering 
competitive pressure.  An otherwise well-positioned firm can quickly find itself under siege 
by upstart rivals that are using social media successfully to increase awareness of their 
products and services, to engage in effective targeted marketing and to improve relations with 
partners in their supply chains.371  By virtue of the same technology a powerful brand can be 
damaged in minutes as news spreads rapidly of a product fault, consumer complaints or 
apparent ethical lapses.372  For senior executives, social media also means, as the president of 
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an executive coaching firm said in 2018, “(e)verything you do, everything you say and 
everything you write can and will be parsed and evaluated by everybody.”373  The increased 
scrutiny helps to explain why CEO dismissals precipitated by ethical lapses increased 36 
percent between 2011 and 2016.374 
A detrimental public backlash has always been a risk for public company executives.  
Due to social media, however, the cycle can now kick into operation much more quickly.  
The primary share price decline Pacific Gas & Electric Co. suffered due to 1987 revelations 
of groundwater contamination of water in Hinkley, California occurred when Erin 
Brockovich, a hit movie about litigation arising from the incident, was released in 2000.375  
The contrast is stark with a public relations challenge Starbucks faced in April 2018 when 
two black men were arrested in a Philadelphia Starbucks store following a dispute about 
bathroom access.  Within two days, the company, mindful of calls for a boycott prompted by 
widespread circulation on Twitter of a video of the incident, announced it would close its 
stores for an afternoon in May to provide anti-bias training for its 175,000 employees.376   
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It might seem that given technological trends there is little room to question the notion 
that challenges by rival firms weigh heavily on the minds of corporate executives.377  A 
potent counter-narrative has emerged, however, that challenges the notion that upstarts are 
engaging in the regular felling of corporate giants.378  As Senator Warren said in 2016, there 
are fears “today, in America, competition is dying.”379  The President’s Council of Economic 
Advisers indicated in a 2016 report “(w)hile there are many benefits of competition for 
consumers and workers, competition appears to be declining in at least part of the 
economy.”380  The Economist concurs, arguing “the obvious conclusion is that the American 
economy is too cosy for incumbents.”381  There have even been suggestions that America 
could be returning to the oligopolistic market conditions that prompted John Kenneth 
Galbraith to turn to countervailing powers to explain why the mid-20th century business 
sector was performing well despite considerable muting of the discipline associated with 
competition from rivals.382  Economist Tyler Cowen claimed in a 2017 book where he said 
American society had become counterproductively complacent “(w)e’re coming 
uncomfortably close to that static, conformist caricature of the 1950s oligopolistic business 
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life where the relative status of the major companies just doesn’t change that much over 
time.”383   
Ironically, given that the internet has been seen as a primary catalyst for intensifying 
competition, high-tech has become the major source of fears about the anti-competitive 
accumulation of market power.  History can account for the apparent contradiction, with the 
competitive dynamics in the tech sector having changed dramatically recently.  As the 
Economist said in 2016 “(i)n the 1990s Silicon Valley was a playground for startups.  It is 
now the fief of a handful of behemoths.”384 
Apple, Alphabet (the parent company of search engine Google), Amazon, Facebook 
and Microsoft stand out as purveyors of market power in the tech world in that they have 
each built up and now control platforms that users are highly dependent upon, akin to 
customers of ostensibly rapacious railroads in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.385  These 
dominant firms benefit from and exploit powerful “network effects” associated with their 
platforms – for a customer switching to a competing platform few use is a self-defeating 
strategy – that operate as powerful barriers to entry to potential rivals.386  Nevertheless, these 
firms are not easing off, avoiding difficult decisions and enjoying a “quiet life” in the manner 
traditionally associated with enterprises that dominate an industry with oligopolistic 
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features.387  The New York Times has said of Apple, Alphabet/Google, Amazon, Facebook 
and Microsoft that none has  
“slowed down investing intended to further expand its area of control — for instance, 
Google keeps investing in search, Facebook is still spending heavily to create new 
social-networking features, and Amazon remains relentless in creating new ways to 
let people shop.  At the same time, they are all locked in intense battles for new 
markets and technologies.”388 
Moreover, an oligopolistic quiet life seems unlikely for tech sector executives any time soon.  
The Economist, despite its warnings about the coziness of the American economy, has said 
that with China’s tech industry being on course for parity with America’s in 10 to 15 years 
“(f)or Silicon Valley, it is time to get paranoid.”389   
Moving beyond the tech sector, available data tend to confirm that even if the 
competitive pressure under which businesses operate has eased off since the late 1990s, 
today’s public company executives have good reason to be more apprehensive than their 
1950s and 1960s counterparts.  The turnover rate with large business enterprises indicates, for 
instance, that the market environment is more dynamic than it was during the managerial 
capitalism era.  With Fortune 500 companies, 57 percent of those on the 1995 list were gone 
by 2015 as compared with only 45 percent of 1955 companies having exited by 1975.390  
Concentration levels calculated taking into account for a wide range of industrial sectors both 
the number of companies operating and the market share of the biggest firms reveal a similar 
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pattern.  Measures of concentration increased 45 percent across industries between 1995 and 
2015 but were still 18 percent lower in 2015 than 1975.391  It follows that even if executives 
of public corporations need not be as fearful of competitors as they were as the 20th century 
drew to a close, market power does not insulate executives of dominant firms from 
competitive pressure to the same extent as in the mid-20th century. 
VI. CONCLUSION  
New corporate governance controversies crop up regularly, with debates being 
sustained by a corporate governance reform “industry” operating out of the shareholder 
community, academia and professional advisory firms that has a vested interest in keeping 
change permanently on the agenda.392  For the corporate governance industry, the 1950s and 
1960s could be construed as a source of embarrassment.  This was an era of “loyalty to the 
company,”393 with corporate scandals being rare.  This was also an era, however, where 
neither boards nor shareholders played a prominent role in fostering managerial 
accountability.  Boards and shareholders monopolize present day corporate governance 
discourse, with proposed solutions to concerns about managerial accountability usually being 
channelled through adjustments to these two internal governance mechanisms.  Yet, while 
boards and shareholders were a governance afterthought during the heyday of managerial 
capitalism restraint was the norm for corporate executives. 
This article has sought to resolve the governance-related paradox of 1950s and 1960s 
managerial accountability by drawing upon an intellectual construct from that era, namely 
                                                          
391  Kathleen M. Kahle & René M. Stulz, Is the US Public Corporation in Trouble?, 31 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 67, 72 (2017).    
392  Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics, 94 BOSTON 
UNIV. L. REV. 1997, 1998 (2014).    
393  EDMUND P. LEARNED, DAVID N. ULRICH & DONALD R. BOOZ, EXECUTIVE ACTION 48 
(1951).   
81 
 
John Kenneth Galbraith’s notion of countervailing power.  From that departure point, we 
have considered the manner in which three “external” accountability mechanisms – unions, 
competition from rivals and governmental regulation – operated both at the time and in 
subsequent decades.  Borrowing from Galbraith to understand corporate governance better 
must be done with some care.  He was interested primarily in constraints applicable to 
corporations rather than management, partly because he assumed executives would seek to 
foster corporate growth so as to increase their personal power and influence rather than 
exploit the discretion available to them in a narrowly personal manner.394  Nevertheless, the 
discipline which unions and governmental regulation imposed on public companies and their 
executives during the middle decades of the 20th century do help to explain why managerial 
wrongdoing was a rarity.    
This article, by considering developments in the 1950s and 1960s, has demonstrated 
through historical evidence why it is beneficial analytically to think of corporate governance 
in terms of external as well as internal accountability mechanisms.  No attempt has been 
made to offer a thoroughgoing analysis of external constraints.  Unions, competition from 
rivals and governmental regulation are only a few examples of external accountability 
mechanisms potentially relevant for public company executives.  Some additional candidates 
were mentioned briefly in the Introduction, namely the market for corporate control, auditors, 
rating organizations and the media.395  There are others as well, with capital market discipline 
being one.  If access to capital is tight, otherwise free-wheeling executives will have to 
modify, postpone or even abandon their more ambitious schemes.  It so happens that for big 
public companies during the 1950s and 1960s the effect would have been modest in practice.  
Such firms usually had ample cash on hand due to being “awash in profits” as a result of their 
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market power and the buoyant economy.396  Nevertheless, in other contexts, capital markets 
can be a potent check on managerial discretion.   
As well as drawing upon history to underscore the importance of external 
accountability mechanisms in relation to corporate governance, this article has focused on the 
present day to illustrate why this insight is particularly pertinent now.  As internal 
accountability mechanisms both boards and shareholders have become substantially more 
robust since the middle decades of the 20th century.  It is likely, however, with both that 
limits on their potency are coming into view.  In the case of boards, there are few obvious 
structural moves left to enhance monitoring capabilities.  As for shareholders, hedge funds 
have emerged since 2000 as a meaningful source of public company discipline but hedge 
fund activism may have peaked.  Index trackers, seemingly the next “big thing” in the 
shareholder universe, insist they are not mere “professional snoozers”397 but their business 
model suggests that it is unlikely they will be exercising substantial control over public 
company executives anytime soon.  Given these trends, with respect to the analysis of 
corporate governance the time is ripe to factor in external mechanisms as fully as internal 
mechanisms.    
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